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Abstract 
Countries compete with one another for funds distributed by nongovernment 
organizations (NGOs). We examine the competition over poverty and governance 
conducted by a NGO in the allocation of its funds among potential recipient countries. 
The NGO in its decisionmaking process also takes into account the initial conditions of 
each potential recipient, including the current quality of governance and wealth 
(poverty). For example, all else equal, the poorer country will have a higher probability 
of obtaining funds; or, the better the applicant’s governance, the greater are its gains. 
Moreover, the maximum aid a country can obtain depends on its wealth. Investment in 
good governance, the wealth/poverty status of the applicant, and its current quality of 
governance will in conjunction determine the funds potential recipients can expect to 
obtain. We also consider recent changes in the levels of these factors in our attempt to 
understand the roles these factors play in the competition for aid, and the outcome for 
the quality of governance. 
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1 Introduction 
A major goal of foreign aid has become the encouragement and development of a 
proper set of institutions, including the legal framework of the society and its social 
conventions. In the language of the current discussion, the goal is to encourage ‘good 
governance’. At the heart of the argument supporting the good governance criterion in 
aid allocations is the claim that aid is effective only in an appropriate policy 
environment; otherwise, it will be diverted by corrupt bureaucracies and self-interested 
governments. Although not universally embraced, a stylized fact of development policy 
considers ‘good governance’ to be a necessary pre-requisite on order for foreign aid to 
become generally effective in achieving development goals. 
Good governance can also be perceived as a long-term goal. According to this view, 
various stop-gap aid allocations may be effective for reaching short-run development 
goals but over the longer term, continuous economic improvement requires proper 
administration, a well-functioning legal system, etc. Here we can view the situation as 
one in which aid-giving has multiple objectives—short-run and long-run goals, where 
the long-term objectives are achieved through the pursuit of good governance. The 
existence of multiple objectives may give rise to the necessity of making specific 
decisions where the aid budget is to be allocated, for example, for achieving short-run or 
long-run objectives. Even when there is only one goal (the elimination of poverty, for 
example), there may be trade-offs between meeting this goal in the short  and the 
long run.  
We adopt this perspective here. Aid is intended by the donors as encouragement for 
spending so that it produces current benefits, and develops the capacity to continue 
providing benefit in the long run. But there is only so much aid that can be allocated. 
We examine how a donor can structure the aid award in order to meet its multiple goals.  
Our donor is a nongovernment organization (NGO). During the 1990s donor 
governments and multilateral institutions began to rely heavily on NGOs for allocating 
aid and for implementing their aid projects/programmes.1 The NGO must decide how to 
allocate its aid among potential recipients, taking into account both short-run and long-
run objectives. Under certain conditions, the NGO will establish a contest for aid funds 
among potential recipient countries. What we examine on the donor’s side in particular 
is the design of the contest and its implications for governance among the potential 
recipients. The NGO, faced with multiple objectives, may find it optimal to discriminate 
against some potential recipients, which at times could mean that aid is awarded to the 
richer country and denied to the poorer. 
The literature on the appropriate goals of foreign aid has taken several turns, as 
discussed by McGillivray et al. (2005), Heckelman and Knack (2005), Lahiri and 
                                                 
1   During the 1990s the number and roles of international NGOs participating in the foreign aid process 
grew by 19.3 per cent. For all the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries, official 
development assistance (ODA) to NGOs increased from US$928 million in 1991-92 to US$1246 
million in 2002, up by 34 per cent, or an increase from 1.59 per cent to 2.14 per cent of all DAC-ODA 
over the same period. For the United Kingdom, where this shift is quite stark, the ODA funding to 
NGOs went from US$21 million to US$226, a jump of 976.2 per cent, bringing all UK ODA up from 
0.65 per cent in 1990-91 to 4.6 per cent in 2002. See Epstein and Gang (2006), for an analysis of the 
role of NGOs in the aid process.  
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Michaelowa (2006), and Mavrotas and Villanger (2006). We examine how donors can 
distribute aid in an efficient way while acknowledging the goal of establishing good 
governance in the long run. This can be done through an aid contest: recipient countries 
need to know that aid is allocated by the donor to the country investing in good 
governance. This concept has previously been presented in the literature, most notably 
by Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller (1997) and Svensson (2003). Our setup is somewhat 
different and deserves attention (earlier papers do not use the contest function). 
In section 2, we present the basic elements of our model. The contest over NGOs funds 
is described in section 3, while section 4 examines total (aggregate) investment in good 
governance. In section 5 we consider a discriminating NGO and section 6 concludes. 
2 Basic  model 
There are many paths an NGO can follow in pursuing its objective of helping those in 
need. For example, an NGO could give cash to the governments of the countries on 
greatest need, enabling the recipient to distribute the funds as appropriate. Another 
option is for the NGO to promote good governance in potential recipients, based on the 
premise that good governance in itself will help the needy. NGOs allocating funds to 
potential recipient countries with substantial poor populations could use these resources 
to try to reach the needy directly while at the same time encouraging the aided countries 
to invest in good governance.  
Assume the NGO has an F amount of aid funds to allocate to two potential needy 
countries, i = 1, 2. The wealth of country i is given by wi and this country has a marginal 
productivity level M(wi) for each dollar of aid it obtains. Generally, the marginal 
productivity of aid decreases with the wealth of the country: the additional aid dollar has 
a smaller impact in the wealthier country has than in the poorer country. On the other 
hand, the argument can be made that there are circumstances under which it is the 
wealthier country that will achieve a larger marginal benefit from each aid dollar. In our 
analysis below, we consider both cases.  
The NGO can decide to allocate a proportion Pi of the funds it has to distribute to 
country i (and 1–Pi to the other country). If this is the distribution decision, then the 
value of the funds received by country i equals  () F w M P i i and the value received by 
country j equals ( ) () ( )F w M P F w M P j i j j − = 1.   
The NGO can also create a contest under which each country has to invest in good 
governance in order to receive aid. The nature of the contest is that in equilibrium the 
proportion of funds directed to each country is a function of its allocation of resources 
towards good governance. Denote the resources allocated to good governance by 
country i to be xi. The net payoff to country i investing resources in good governance at 
a level of xi and receiving NGO funds at a level of  () F w M P i i  equals: 
() 1, 2 ii i i uP M w F x i =− =    (1) 
The proportion of funds the country receives from the NGO, Pi, is a positive function of 
the resources invested in good governance, xi, and is negatively related to the good- 
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governance investment of the other country, xj. Thus, the proportion of funds country i 
receives is a function of the resources invested by both countries. It is positively 
affected by the investment of country j:  ( ) j i i x x P , s o  t h a t  
() () ,,
0, 0 and 1
ii j ii j
ij
ij
Pxx Pxx
PP
xx
∂∂
>< + =
∂∂
. 
As is commonly assumed in the recent political economy literature,2 let the objective 
function of the NGO be a weighted average of net payoff/social welfare,  ) ( 2 1 u u + , and 
investment in good governance, () 2 1 x x +  of the potential recipient countries: 
() ( ) () 2 1 2 1 1 (.) x x u u NGO + − + + = α α    (2) 
The parameters α and (1-α) are the weights assigned to social welfare in the short run 
(not taking into account the effect good governance may have in the long run on the 
country) and the contestants’ investment in good governance which will affect social 
welfare in the long run.3  
If the NGO creates a contest between countries (see Epstein and Nitzan 2006, 2007), the 
countries will try to maximize their net payoff and determine their optimal investments 
in good governance()
*
2
*
1, x x . Given their investments in good governance, the NGO 
determines the proportion of funds obtained by each country, ( )
*
2
*
1 , P P . Thus the NGO 
determines the funds to be contested, while the decision regarding the potential 
recipients who receive aid funds depends on their own and others investments in good 
governance. The contest is not in absolute terms. Namely, the NGO does not set a goal 
according to which those that invest above a certain level will be awarded aid funds. 
What the NGO does is to allocate the resources it has, F, as a function of each country’s 
investment relative to what both countries invested in good governance. Given the 
investment in good governance, the proportion of funds each country will obtain is 
determined, and thus the net payoffs, each country’s short-term social welfare, 
( )
*
2
*
1 u u +  can be calculated. In such a case the value of the NGO’s objective function as 
a result of the contest equals: 
() () () () ()
*
2
*
1
*
2 2
*
2
*
1 1
*
1 1 (.) x x x F w M P x F w M P NGO
c + − + − + − = α α  (3) 
On the other hand, the NGO may decide to distribute its funds between two applicant so 
that each receives a proportion of the funds without consideration of their good 
governance investments. The NGO can divide the funds so that each country is 
                                                 
2   See, for example, Epstein and Nitzan (2006, 2007); Grossman and Helpman (2001); Persson and 
Tabellini (2000). 
3   We need to note two additional modelling issues, the linearity of x and the timing of the game. The 
linearity of x both in (1) and in (2) is very convenient (this can be seen by substituting (1) into (2)). 
More comprehensive modelling of how x affects the recipient and the donor would not have changed 
the main story of the paper. The timing of the game is as in previous aid-contest models: recipient 
countries first choose their behaviour, taking into account the reaction of the donor, and then the donor 
decides the allocation of aid; i.e., the NGO acts as a follower. As is well known, the main problem of 
such behaviour is time-inconsistency for the recipient country.  
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allocated the proportion it would have received if a contest had been generated as a 
function of investment in good governance, ( )
*
2
*
1 , P P . 
Therefore, if the NGO does not create a contest, preferring instead to divide its aid 
funds according to ( )
*
2
*
1 , P P , the total net benefit for the recipients (the social welfare of 
the countries in the short run) equals  () () F w M P F w M P 2
*
2 1
*
1 + . Plugging this value into 
the NGOs’ objective function (as given in (2)) while setting the good governance 
investment to zero ( ) () ( ) 0 , 0 ,
*
2
*
1 = x x , the value of the NGO’s objective function equals: 
() () ( ) F w M P F w M P NGO
nc
2
*
2 1
*
1 (.) + = α  (4) 
The NGO creates a contest only if the value of its objective function in doing so is at 
least as high as it would have obtained without the contest and at the same time had 
divided the funds in the same proportions as in a contest: 
(.) (.)
nc c NGO NGO ≥    (5) 
From (3), (4) and (5) we obtain that the following must hold in order for the NGO to 
create a contest: 
() () ( ) () ( )
() () () .
1
2
*
2 1
*
1
*
2
*
1
*
2 2
*
2
*
1 1
*
1
F w M P F w M P
x x x F w M P x F w M P
+ ≥
+ − + − + −
α
α α
 (6) 
Rewriting inequality (6) we find that a contest is created by the NGO if the following 
condition holds: 
()
1
1
≤
−α
α
 (7) 
Namely, the NGO creates a contest among countries if the weight assigned by the NGO 
to the short-run social welfare, ( )
*
2
*
1,u u , denoted by α , and the affect of the long-run via 
good-governance investment, ()
*
2
*
1, x x , denoted by  α − 1 :
() α
α
− 1
, is smaller than a unit. 
Thus the condition of creating a contest is that the value of the weight assigned by the 
NGO to the short-run social welfare, ( )
*
2
*
1,u u , α , is less than or equal to 
2
1 . We may 
conclude that,  
Proposition 1: If the NGO is concerned with good governance at least to the same 
degree it is concerned about the present value of its current donations (the social welfare 
in the short run), then it prefers to create a contest for funds among potential recipients. 
The outcome of the contest is a function of the investment in good governance by 
countries wishing to receive NGO funds.  
This result states that if the NGO assigns at least the same weight to the effect the 
donations have on the current social welfare of the receiving countries as it does to the  
5 
investment these recipients make in good governance, the NGO will create a contest 
among countries.4 
3  The contest over NGOs funds 
Let us now consider the competition created by the NGO between two countries over 
the receipt of the aid funds available for distribution. In other words, we assume that 
conditions exist which make it worthwhile for the NGO to create a contest rather than 
merely assign each country a proportion of the available aid funds, i.e., 
2
1
≤ α . 
In order to consider such a contest, we must define a contest success function. 
Following Epstein and Gang (2006),5 consider a variant of the Tullock (1980) non-
discriminatory contest success function in which winning is a function of investment in 
good governance: 
()
()
1
11 1 2
12
2
22 1 1
12
,,
,1 .
x
PP x x
xx
x
Pxx P
x x
==
+
=− =
+
 (8) 
Each country investing in good governance obtains resources from the NGO. 
Investment in good governance has both negative and positive short-run effects. The 
short-run negative effect arises from expenditure, whereas the positive effect comes 
from the resources obtained. Since we assume that investment of these resources in 
good governance is made only in order to secure funds from the NGO, the countries are 
not concerned about the investment’s long-run effects; otherwise they would have 
invested in good governance without any connection to the funds they may receive. In 
the event that they do invest in good governance, then the created contest is an increase 
in investment resulting from the receipt of NGO funds. The net payoffs for the two 
countries investing resources ( ) 2 1 , x x  in good governance to obtain NGO funds equal: 
()
()
1
11 1
12
2
22 2
12
,
and,
.
x
uM w F x
xx
x
uM w F x
xx
=−
+
=−
+
. (9) 
                                                 
4    This result has similar flavour to that presented by Epstein and Nitzan (2006, 2007) where they 
consider the conditions under which a politician will create a contest between different interest 
groups. In Epstein and Nitzan, the alternative to a contest is to vote in favour (with probability one) in 
favour of the interest group that has the most to gain from obtaining the appropriate legislative 
5   Epstein and Gang (2006) consider a contest in which the lobbying efforts by countries determine the 
proportion of funds each will receive. In this paper we do not consider the effect of lobbying on the 
proportion of funds distributed by the NGO to each country.  
6 
Each country invests in good governance so as to maximize its net payoff, taking into 
account the effect good governance has on the allocation of NGO funds. The first-order 
conditions are given by:6 
()
() j i j i F w M
x x
x
x
u
i
j
i
i ≠ = ∀ = −
+
=
∂
∂
2 , 1 , 0 1 2
2 1
   (10) 
Solving the first-order conditions for both players, the Nash equilibrium investment of 
both players in good governance equals: 
() ()
() () ()
()()
() () ()
22
12 1 2 **
12 22
12 12
and
Mw Mw MwMw
xF xF
Mw Mw Mw Mw
==
++
   (11) 
From the definition of the contest success function (as defined in (8)) and the 
equilibrium investment in good governance (as presented in (11)), the equilibrium 
proportion of funds each country obtains from the NGO equals: 
()
() ()
()
() ()
12 **
12
12 12
and
Mw Mw
PP
M wM w M wM w
==
++
   (12) 
Country 1 will invest more resources in good governance and will receive a larger 
proportion of the funds awarded by the NGO if it holds that the marginal benefit from 
the funds in country 1 is greater than that of country 2,  ()
()
1
2
1 >
w M
w M
. 
Thus, 
Proposition 2: If the marginal productivity of the obtained funds decreases with the 
wealth of the countries (for w 2 ≥ w1 it holds that  () () 12 , M wM w ≥ ) then the poorer 
country will invest more resources in good governance and will receive a larger 
proportion of the funds awarded by the NGO: 
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
1 P P and x x ≥ ≥ .  
4 Total  (aggregate)  investment in good governance 
Total investment in good governance by both countries, from (11), is: 
()()
() () () 2 1
2 1 *
2
*
1 w M w M
w M w M
F x x
+
= +    (13) 
Let us now consider the case where the NGO chooses two countries to compete for its 
aid funds, i.e., when
1
2
α ≤ , so we care about both() 2 1,x x . Would the NGO prefer that 
                                                 
6   It can be verified that the second order conditions are satisfied.  
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the two countries are more or less alike in terms of their wealth? In order to answer this 
question, we have to determine what exactly is the NGO objective. Let us start by 
considering a scenario in which the NGO prefers to maximize the total value of the 
resources invested by the two countries in good governance. In this case, the NGO sets 
the weight assigned on the social welfare (in the short run) to zero: 0 = α . 
Assume that country 1 is poorer than country 2, thus w1<w2. We wish to consider what 
happens to the total value of the resources invested in good governance by the two 
countries when, instead of country 1, a different—and slightly more wealthier—
country, is chosen to compete against country 2. What we are really examining is the 
case in which the wealth of country 1 has been increased. Mathematically this means 
taking the derivative of the total investment in good governance with regard to the 
wealth of country 1. If this derivative is positive, this means that increasing the wealth 
of country 1 increases aggregate investment in good governance, whereas a negative 
derivative indicates that increasing the wealth of country 1 decreases aggregate 
investment in good governance. Formally, 
()() ()
() () 2 1
2
1
1
1
*
2
*
1
w M w M
w FM
w
w M
w
x x
+ ∂
∂
=
∂
+ ∂
   (14) 
Thus,  () ()
⎭
⎬
⎫
⎩
⎨
⎧
∂
∂
=
⎭
⎬
⎫
⎩
⎨
⎧
∂
+ ∂
1
1
1
*
2
*
1
w
w M
Sign
w
x x
Sign  . 
Proposition 3: The wealthier the country, the lower the marginal productivity of the 
NGO funds, then the NGO prefers having two extreme countries competing for the 
funds: the poorest competes with the wealthiest of the countries. 
Consider next the case in which the NGO is concerned not only with the total good-
governance investment but also with the current benefits that accrue to the countries 
directly from the funds they receive. In other words, we need calculate the value of 
NGO’s objective function as defined (3).  
Before proceeding to the value of the objective function, let us first calculate the net 
payoff of the different countries in equilibrium. From (9), (11) and (12) we obtain the 
net payoff of the different countries when investing in good governance equals: 
()
() () ()
2 , 1 2
2 1
3
* =
+
= i F
w M w M
w M
u
i
i    (15) 
As we can see, the country having the higher marginal benefit,  () i w M , from the NGO 
funds, will have a higher net payoff. 
Using (11) and (15), we can now calculate the equilibrium value of the NGO objective 
function as defied in (3): 
() ( )()() () ()
() () 2 1
2
2 2 1
2
1 2 1
(.)
w M w M
w M w M w M w M
F NGO
c
+
+ − +
=
α α α
 (16)  
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Let us now consider how an increase in the wealth of country 1 affects the value of the 
NGO objective function: 
() ()()( )() ()
() () []
()
1
1
2
2 1
2
2 2 1
2
1
1
3 1 2 (.)
w
w M
w M w M
w M w M w M w M
F
w
NGO
c
∂
∂
+
− + +
=
∂
∂ α α α
 (17) 
We have shown that in order for the NGO to create a contest between the countries, it 
must hold that the weight it assigns to the investment in good governance is at least 0.5: 
()
2
1
1 ≥ −α . Using this fact together with (17) we conclude, 
Proposition 4:  
  1.  If the wealthier country has a lower marginal productivity with regard to the use 
of the funds it obtains from the NGO,  ()
0
1
1 <
∂
∂
w
w M , then the NGO prefers to have 
two extreme countries competing for the funds: the poorest with the wealthiest.  
  2.   On the other hand, the wealthier the country, the higher the marginal benefit it 
can obtain from the NGO funds  ()
0
1
1 >
∂
∂
w
w M
, then the term 
() ()()( )() ( )
2
2 2 1
2
1 3 1 2 w M w M w M w M α α α − + +  may be negative. Thus under this 
condition,  ()
0
1
1 >
∂
∂
w
w M
, it is not clear whether the NGO prefers the extreme 
countries in terms of wealth to compete against each other or with countries at 
similar wealth levels. 
5  A discriminating NGO 
In the discussion above we considered the case of a non-discriminating contest success 
function under which each country obtains funds from the NGO relative to its 
investment in good governance:  () j i j i
x x
x
x x P
j i
i
j i i ≠ =
+
= 2 , 1 , , . Namely, a unit of 
investment made by each country has the same value in the contest success function.  
The question we now pose is: would the NGO benefit by creating a contest that can 
discriminate between the two countries? In other words, should the NGO create a 
contest that takes into account the wealth of each country in the contest success 
function? Currently our outcome is a function of the wealth of the countries (the 
investment levels and the proportion of the aid fund each country receives, ()
*
2
*
1, x x  and 
()
*
2
*
1 , P P , respectively. Our concern now is whether we should build into the contest 
success function the ability to discriminate with regard to each country’s wealth. Let us 
consider a discriminating contest success function in the following way: 
() j i j i
x x d
x d
x x P
j i
i
j i i ≠ =
+
= 2 , 1 , ,    (18)  
9 
where d is a constant known to both countries. If d<1, then country j has an advantage 
over country i. Namely, each unit invested by country j has a higher value in the contest 
success function than the same unit invested by county i. Similarly, if d>1, then 
country i has an advantage over country j. In the case where d=1 both countries place 
the same value on their investment in terms of the contest success function. This is the 
case we examined above. We now wish to see what is the optimal level of d 
(discriminating value) that the NGO sets and whether this value is a function of the 
wealth of the different countries. Here, d is determined endogenously. 
Given the new contest success function, the countries’ net payoffs equal: 
() ()
12
11 1 22 2
12 12
and
dx x
uM w F x uM w F x
dx x dx x
=− =−
++
    (19) 
Each country invests in good governance so that it maximizes its net payoff. The first 
order-conditions are given by:7 
()
()
()
()
12
1 2
1 12
21
2 2
2 12
10 ,
and,
10 .
ud x
MwF
x dx x
ud x
Mw F
x dx x
∂
=− =
∂ +
∂
=− =
∂ +
   (20) 
Solving the two first-order conditions for both players, we obtain that the Nash 
equilibrium investments equal: 
() ()
() () ()
()()
() () ()
22
12 1 2 **
12 22
12 12
and
dM w M w dM w M w
xF xF
d Mw Mw d Mw Mw
==
++
   (21) 
and the proportion of aid each country obtains in equilibrium equals: 
()
() ()
()
() ()
12 **
12
12 12
and
dM w M w
PP
d Mw Mw d Mw Mw
==
++
   (22) 
Consider the effect this new contest success function (which allows for discrimination) 
has on the total amount of investment in good governance. From (21), total equilibrium 
investment in good governance equals (by both countries): 
()() () () ()
() () ()
2
2 1
2 1 2 1 *
2
*
1 w M w dM
w M w M w M w M
Fd x x
+
+
= +  (23) 
What is the optimal discrimination level that maximizes aggregate investment in good 
governance by both countries? In answering the question, we assume that the NGO is 
only concerned with the good-governance investments of both countries, without 
                                                 
7   It can be verified that the second order conditions are satisfied.  
10 
concern for the direct benefit the funds will have on the recipients. In other words, the 
weight set by the NGO on the net benefits of the countries is zero and that the weight set 
by the NGO on the good-governance investments equals to one,  1 1 = −α , as described 
in equation (3). 
The first-order condition for maximizing (23) with regard to the discriminating index d 
equals:8 
() ()() () () () () () ()
() () ()
**
12 12 1 2 1 2
2
12
0
xx MwMw d Mw Mw Mw Mw
Fd
d dM w M w
∂+ −+
=− =
∂ +
   (24) 
Solving (24) we obtain that optimal discrimination level equals: 
()
() 1
2 *
w M
w M
d =    (25) 
We therefore can conclude that, 
Proposition 5: Consider the case where the wealthier country has the lower marginal 
productivity of the funds obtained from the NGO: for w1<w2 it holds that 
() () 2 1 w M w M > .  In order for the NGO to maximize total (aggregate) investment in 
good governance for both countries, the NGO must discriminate against the poorer 
country. This helps the wealthier country have a higher chance of obtaining funds and, 
by doing so, increases total (aggregate) investment in good governance. 
Now let’s consider the more general case where the NGO wishes to maximize its 
objective function as was presented in (2): 
() ( ) () 2 1 2 1 1 (.) x x u u NGO + − + + = α α    (2) 
Using (18), (21) and (22) together with (2), (2) becomes: 
()( ) () () ( ) ()() ()
() () ()
32 2 3 2
11 2 1 2 2
2
12
11
(.)
dMw d Mw Mw d Mw Mw Mw
NGO F
dM w M w
αα α α −−+ −−+ +
=
+
   
Let us now consider the discrimination level that will maximize (26). The first-order 
condition is give by:9 
()() ( ) () ( ) ( )()()( )()
() () ()
.
3 1 1 1 3 1 (.)
3
2 1
2
2 2 1
2
1
2 1
w M w dM
w M w M w M d w dM
w M w FM
d
NGO
+
− + − + − − + −
=
∂
∂ α α α
 
                                                 
8   It can be verified that the second order condition is satisfied. 
9  It can be verified that the second order condition holds. 
(26) 
(27)  
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Solving the first-order condition, 0
(.)
=
∂
∂
d
NGO , we find that the optimal level of 
discrimination is: 
()
()
() ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2
2 1
1
2 *
1 3 1
1 3 1
w M w M
w M w M
w M
w M
d
− + −
− + −
=
α α
α α    (28) 
We can see that if the NGO is only concerned with good governance, 0 = α , we obtain 
the result presented above in (25),  ()
() 1
2 *
w M
w M
d = . In the case that the NGO does not care 
at all about good governance and only is concerned with the correct net welfare of the 
countries ( 1 = α ) then the optimal discrimination equals  ()
()
2
1
2 *
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
=
w M
w M
d . In other words 
the NGO will increasingly discriminate between the two countries. Therefore,  
Proposition 6: If the NGO is concerned only about good governance it will discriminate 
against the poorer country. However if the NGO also is concerned about the current 
wealth of the countries, it will discriminate even further against the poorer country. 
Notice that the discrimination value of d is a function of the weight sent by the NGO: 
()() () ()
() ( )()( )() ()
2
1 2 1
2
2
2
1 2
*
1 3 1
2
w M w M w M
w M w M w M d
− + −
−
=
∂
∂
α α α
   (29) 
Thus,  () () ()
2
2
2
1
*
w M w M Sign
d
Sign − =
⎭
⎬
⎫
⎩
⎨
⎧
∂
∂
α
 . 
Increasing the weight assigned to the welfare component, α  may increase or decrease 
the discrimination index. If the poorer country receives higher marginal productivity 
from the funds obtained from the NGO,  () ()
2
2
2
1 2 1 w M w M w w > ⇒ < then increasing α  
will increase the discriminating value d and make the two countries more equal in terms 
of the effect the investment in good governance has on the contest success function. 
6 Conclusion   
Countries compete with one another for funds distributed by nongovernment 
organization. We model the aid allocation decision where the NGO has announced that 
good governance is a criterion for receiving aid. Potential recipients must compete for 
aid funds. The structure of the competition is important to the donor NGO in terms of 
achieving the long-term goal of good governance as well as short-run goals. 
Our modelling and results are somewhat different though in the spirit of two earlier 
papers on aid. Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller (1997) demonstrate that self-interested and 
altruistic donors behave differently with regard to aid allocation decisions and that 
recipients react to donors’ policies in order to increase their share of the aid budget.  
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Svensson (2003) introduces competition among the beneficiaries of foreign assistance, 
with the result that more aid is channelled to a country where the likelihood of a 
successful reform is higher and aid is relatively more effective. This shift of aid towards 
successfully reforming countries raises the incentives to reform. 
In its decisionmaking the NGO in our modelling also takes into account the initial 
conditions of each potential recipient, including the current quality of governance and 
wealth (poverty). For example, all else equal, the poorer country will have a higher 
probability of obtaining funds; or, the better the quality of governance in the applicant 
the more it gains. Moreover, the maximum aid a country can obtain depends on its 
wealth. Investment in good governance, the wealth/poverty status of the applicant, and 
its current quality of governance will, together, determine the funds potential recipients 
expect to obtain. We outline the roles these factors play in the competition for aid, and 
the outcome for the quality of governance.  
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